Annotated Bibliography on the Trinity in Recent Philosophical Theology
Compiled by Fred Sanders (with help from research assistants Mark Makin and Jenni Glaser)
This document is a work in progress, and makes no claims to completeness or correctness — in fact, I can’t even promise it’s a good idea to catalog all of this conversation. But here it is in case you are the kind of person who wants a little bit of guidance through the rapidly-expanding project of thinking about the doctrine of the Trinity using the tools of philosophical theology.
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William P. Alston, “Substance and the Trinity” in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall and Gerald O’Collins, eds, The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 179-201.
Abstract:
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Timothy Bartel, “The Plight of the Relative Trinitarian,” Religious Studies 24 (1988), 129-55.
Abstract: The author argues that Relative Trinitarianism is a fatally flawed solution to the problem of the Law of Non-Contradiction because it defies Leibniz’s Law (the Indiscernability of Identicals) and rejects the traditional doctrine of divine notiones. Instead, he puts forth the Social theory of the Trinity as both a logically sound and traditionally viable alternative.
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Timothy Bartel, “Could There Be More Than One Almighty?” Religious Studies 29 (1993), 465-95.
Abstract (taken from author): “I argue that the attribute of essential almightiness, properly construed, entails that it is impossible for two or more beings with this same attribute simultaneously to will incompatible states of affairs to obtain at that same moment. Then… I explain why it appears that the Social Trinitarian can logically prevent this kind of clash of wills in the Trinity only by admitting the possibility of a creative stalemate in the Godhead. Section III considers, and rejects, a resourceful proposal of Richard Swinburne’s for ensuring the absence of Trinitarian conflict… Section IV argues that if the doctrine of divine middle knowledge is plausible, then it is also plausible to believe that it is impossible for even a temporary creative stalemate to arise in the Trinity. Finally… I contend that if divine middle knowledge is not possible, the Social Trinitarian must concede that the wills of the Trinity could be locked in permanent creative stalemate—but even so, it is far from obvious that the Social theory is thereby discredited.”
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Jeffrey E. Brower, “The Problem with Social Trinitarianism: A Reply to Edward Wierenga.” Faith and Philosophy (2005).
Abstract (by author): “In a recent article, Edward Wierenga defends a version of Social Trinitarianism according to which the Persons of the Trinity form a unique society of really distinct divine beings, each of whom has its own exemplification of divinity. In this paper, I call attention to several philosophical and psychological difficulties with Wierenga’s account, as well as to a problem that such difficulties pose for Social Trinitarianism generally. I then briefly suggest what I take to be a more promising approach to the Trinity.”
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Jeffrey E. Brower and Michael C. Rea, “Understanding the Trinity,” Logos 8:1 (Winter 2005), 145-157.
Abstract:“The doctrine of the Trinity poses a deep a difficult problem,” a problem that often results in the tendency towards either modalism or tritheism. The authors provide a brief history of Trinitarian thought and failed analogies. Finally, they provide three analogies that may be fruitful: the social, psychological and statue-lump theory.
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Jeffrey E. Brower and Michael C. Rea, “Material Constitution and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy (2005).
Abstract (by authors): “The Christian doctrine of the Trinity poses a serious philosophical problem. On the one hand, it seems to imply that there is exactly one divine being; on the other hand, it seems to imply that there are three. There is another well-known philosophical problem that presents us with a similar sort of tension: the problem of material constitution. We argue in this paper that a relatively neglected solution to the problem of the Trinity.”
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David Brown, “Trinitarian Personhood and Individuality,” in Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989) 48-78.
Abstract:
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James Cain, “The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Logic of Relative Identity,” Religious Studies 25 (1989): 141-152.
Abstract (by author): “In this paper we explore one way in which an account of relative identity developed along the lines of [Peter] Geach’s theory might be applied to the way we speak of the Trinity. At the end of the paper an alternative approach, still in terms of relative identity, will also be suggested.”
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Richard Cartwright, “On the Logical Problem of the Trinity,” in Philosophical Essays, ed. Richard Cartwright (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 187-200. [status: filed]
Abstract: The author aims to demonstrate errors in past solutions to the logical problem of the Trinity rather than providing an alternative. He first outlines the history of the doctrine and then refutes Geach’s Social theory of the Trinity. Cartwright accuses Geach of equivocating the persons of the Trinity, concluding that, “If every Divine person is a God, there cannot be fewer Gods than Divine persons.”
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Kelly James Clark, “Trinity or Tritheism?” Religious Studies 32 (1996), 463-476.
Abstract (by author): “The focus of this paper is the social trinitarian account in Richard Swinburne’s The Christian God. After setting out the route Swinburne follows in reaching his conclusions about the Godhead, I endeavour to show two things: (i) that his account does not avoid the charge of tritheism and thus is not faithful to key elements in the Christian creeds; (ii) the philosophical moves behind his conclusions are not compelling if, as we can, we challenge his assumptions about divine necessity. A better account of divine necessity takes us away from Swinburne’s version of trinitarianism/tritheism.”
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Sarah Coakley, “‘Persons’ in the ‘Social’ Doctrine of the Trinity: A Critique of Current Analytic Discussion,” in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall and Gerald O’Collins, eds, The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 126-30.
Abstract:
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Richard Cross, “On Generic and Derivation Views of God’s Trinitarian Substance,” Scottish Journal of Theology 56/4 (2003), 464-480.
Abstract (by author): “The view that the divine substance is some item common to the three persons is frequently rejected in modern Trinitarian thought in favour of the view that the divine substance is properly identical with the Father in a way that is not identical with the Son or Spirit. I argue that these views cannot safeguard this latter doctrine, it is necessary to hold that the divine substance is some item common to the three persons. I show how this view does not require that there is any sense in which the divine substance is prior to the divine persons.”
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Richard Cross, “Two Models of the Trinity?” Heythrop Journal 43 (2002), 275-294.
Abstract (by author): “Contrary to a common assumption, I argue that there is full agreement between East and West on the issue of the relation between the divine essence and the divine persons. I defend this claim by using the understanding of universals found in D. M. Armstrong to cast light on the theories. Taking Gregory of Nyssa and John of Damascus as representatives of the Eastern tradition, I show that this tradition sees the divine essence as a numerically singular object that is wholly present in each divine person. The Eastern tradition explicitly sees this object as a universal. The Western tradition – exemplified in Augustine and Aquinas – likewise sees the divine essence as a numerically singular object that is wholly present in each divine person. But this tradition customarily denies that such an object could be a universal, on the merely philosophical grounds that universals are divided amongst the particulars that share them, and thus cannot be numerically one. Having shown the fundamental consonance of the two traditions, I argue by way of conclusion that differences between social and non–social theories of the Trinity depend entirely on the nature and extent of the features that are supposed to distinguish the persons from each other.”
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Stephen T. Davis, “A Somewhat Playful Proof of the Social Trinity in Five Easy Steps.” Philosophia Christi 1 (1999): 103-5.
Abstract: This is described as a simpler version of “Perichoretic Monotheism” by the author. It is a proof of the Social theory of the Trinity in five steps: “God is love;” “God experiences the highest form of love;” “the highest form of love is love of another;” God was free not to create the world;” “therefore the Social Theory is true.”
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Stephen T. Davis, “Perichoretic Monotheism” in The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, ed. Melville Y. Stewart (Kluwer, 2003), 35-52.
Abstract (by author): “This essay is a defense of one version of the so-called Social Theory of the Trinity (ST), a version that emphasizes the notion of perichoresis. It offers an a priori argument in favor of ST, and defends the theory against four criticisms that have recently been raised against it by professor Brian Leftow: (1) that ST amounts to tritheism; (2) that on ST there is no way to answer the question, “How many Gods are compatible with monotheism?”; (3) that ST raises the specter of inequality among the persons, and (4) that co-mingled divine minds cannot be distinct.”
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Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga Jr., “Introduction” in Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989, pp. 1-20.
Abstract: Philosophy of the Trinity has been greatly influenced by a reaction to both Barth’s monism and Moltmann’s social analogy. The articles following this introduction address the interconnected issues of the Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement and their relation to both philosophy and theology. (JG)
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Edward Feser, “Has Trinitarianism been Shown to be Coherent?” Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997): 87-97.
Abstract (by author): “Macnamara, La Palme Reyes, and Reyes have recently claimed to have shown decisively that the doctrine of the Trinity is internally consistent. They claim, furthermore, that their account does not commit them to any exotic emendations of standard logical theory. The paper demonstrates that they have established neither of these claims. In particular, it is argued that the set of statements they show to be consistent in fact expresses Sabellianism, not Trinitarianism; and that they can avoid this result only via commitment to the (questionable) doctrine of relative identity.”
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Edward Feser, “Swinburne’s Tritheism.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 42 (1997): 175-84.
Abstract (by author):”Richard Swinburne, in The Christian God, is interested in [the content and coherency of the doctrine of the Trinity]. He aims to show that the doctrine is coherent in the course of developing an account of its content. I will argue in this paper that his account fails as a characterization of the content of the doctrine of the Trinity because it amounts to Tritheism, and thus fails also as a demonstration of the coherence of Trinitarianism.”
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Peter Forrest, “Divine Fission: A New Way of Moderating Social Trinitarianism.” Religious Studies 34 (1998): 281-97.
Abstract (by author): “This paper is a contribution to the programme of moderating Social Trinitarianism to achieve a fairly orthodox result. I follow Swinburne in relying heavily on divine thisnessless and in the important speculation that the Trinity arose from a primordial ‘Unitarian’ God. In this paper I explain why I disagree with Swinburnes’ account of how the Trinity came into being and I propose an alternative in which the primordial God fissions into three divine persons for the sake of a loving community.”
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Peter Forrest, “The Trinity and Personal Idenity” in The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, ed. Melville Y. Stewart (Kluwer, 2003), 75-82.
Abstract (by author): “The idea that the doctrine of the Trinity is a mystery suggests one strategy. It is to find something else that defies human comprehension but which we firmly believe in, and use it to speculate about the Trinity. And the obvious—perhaps too obvious—place to look is in ourselves. There are several aspects of human beings that defy human comprehension. One of these is out persistence over time. In this paper I explore the idea that the three Persons stand to each other in a way somewhat analogous to the temporal stages of an enduring person.”
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Douglas Hedley, “Pantheism, Trinitarian Theism and the Idea of Unity: Reflections on the Christian Concept of God,” Religious Studies 32 (1996), 61-77.
Abstract (by author): “Modern analytic philosophy of religion has become increasingly interested in the dogmatic substances of Christian theology. I argue that the doctrine of the Trinity provides an instance of the importance of dogmatic formulation for an appreciation of the philosophical aspect of the Christian concept of God. The starting point of my discussion is the recent defence of pantheism by Michael Levine, and his discussion of Neoplatonist and German Idealist models of deity. Both metaphysical theism and the alleged Neoplatonic metaphysical geneaology of pantheism are considered with particular reference to St. Augustine’s account of creation in the Confessions. Just as it is impossible to distinguish the purely philosophical from the purely dogmatic concept of God, one cannot give an adequate modern account of theism without a rigorous and sensitive treatment of the historical models. The issue of pantheism shows how a misunderstanding of the concept of ‘unity’ can distort our view of theism as a model of deity.”
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David Howard-Snyder, “Trinity Monotheism,” Philosophia Christi 5 (2003): 375-403.
Abstract (taken from author): “We began with a simple argument: the Sameness Clain and the Difference Claim are inconsistent with each other. By way of response, Moreland and Craig suggested that we read the Sameness Claim as implying the Property Identity Claim, not the Person Identity Claim. That response, however, led to the Challenge of Polytheism, to which they responded by invoking their Trinity Monotheism. Unfortunately, their Trinity Monotheism– both on the periphery and at the core– has intolerable consequences for Trinitarianism, or so I have argued. If I am right, then the Challenge of Polytheism remains on the table for Trinity Monotheism; at any rate I cannot see how Moreland’s and Craig’s version of Trinity Monotheism has removed it.”
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Karen Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity,” New Blackfriars 81 (2000), 433-445.
Abstract (taken from author): “In what follows I want however to develop a different kind of objection, one centering on the issue of projection. I will argue, first, that there is a high level of projection in [Social theories of the Trinity], and secondly, that this is not accidental, but built into the nature of the social theorists’ approach. It might be said that this is true of all theology: I will therefore aim to show, thirdly, that even if projection always has a role to play in theology, it is here playing a distinctive, and a distinctly problematic, one.”
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Stephen C. Layman, “Tritheism and the Trinity.” Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988): 291-98.
Abstract (by author): “This paper is a reflection on the two ontological analogies that have played a role in discussion about the Trinity—the Modalist and Social analogies. I argue that the Modal analogy commits one to a view of the divine persons that comports poorly with Scripture. I then consider two arguments to the effect that the doctrine of the Trinity commits one to tritheism. I argue that the Social analogy contains better resources for handling these arguments than the more traditional position, which involves denying that the divine persons are substances.”
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Brian Leftow, “Anti Social Trinitarianism,” in Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall and Gerald O’Collins, eds, The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 203-249.
Abstract: “The Athanasian creed tells christians that ‘we worship one God in Trinity… the Father is God, the Son is God and the Holy Spirit is God. And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.’ Such off arithmetic demands explaining. The explanations I have seen fall into two broad classes. Some begin from the oneness of God, and try to explain just how one God can be three divine Persons. As Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas pursue this project, let us call is Latin trinitarianism (LT). Others start from the threeness of the Persons, and try to say just how three Persons can be one God. Some call this theological project Social Trinitarianism (ST). I now try to recommend LT over ST. I now argue that ST cannot be both orthodox and a version of monotheism. I show en route that LT does not have ST’s problems with monotheism.”
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James Mackey, “Social Models of the Trinity,” Readings in Modern Theology, 123-130
Abstract: The major problem with social models of the trinity is “the projection of current ideas of human relationships into the divine Being, resulting in an ‘immanent’ Trinity which then, of course, becomes normative… for the reconstruction of human relationships.” Numerous pitfalls include: tritheism, Platonic dualism in the form of a dichotomy between the immanent and economic Trinity, and interpreting eschatology through current understanding with no thought of things to come.
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John Macnamara, Marie La Palme Reyes, and Gonzalo E. Reyes, “Logic and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 11 (1994) 3-18.
Abstract [by author]: The paper gives a model of the sentences that express the core of the doctrine of the Trinity. The new elements in the model are: (1) an underlying map between DIVINE PERSON and GOD–in place of the set-theoretic inclusion inclusion, and (2) the notion of a predictable keeping or not keeping phase in a system of kinds. These elements, which are explained in the text, are common in everyday language. The model requires no tampering with the fundamental laws of logic, nor does it require the use of any such difficult metaphysical notions as substance and essence as distinct from person.
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A. P. Martinich, “God, Emperor and Relative Identity.” Franciscan Studies 39 (1979): 180-91.
Abstract (taken from author): “In this paper I shall answer some arguments directed against an explanation of the consistency of the doctrine of the Trinity that I have offered recently, and thereby help clarify our concepts of God and person. My article consists of 3 parts. In Part I, I state why the doctrine of the Trinity appears contradictory: I summarize my way of dispelling the apparent contradiction: I summarize my way of dispelling the apparent contradiction and mention one further advantage of my solution. In Part II, I develop an objection to my view. In Part III, I reply to that objection by drawing upon a passage from Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean.”
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A. P. Martinich, “Identity and Trinity,” Journal of Religion 58 (1978): 169-81.
Abstract: Mostly symbolic logic rather than an essay.
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Tom McCall, “Social Trinitarianism and Tritheism Again: A Response to Brian Leftow.” Philosophia Christi 5 (2003): 405-430.
Abstract (taken from author): “In this paper I propose to address these concerns with special focus on the latter. Because a recent essay by Brian Leftow forcefully advances the second criticism while evidencing a tacit reliance on the first, I will make special reference to his work. Leftow states that ST (Social Trinitarianism) ‘starts from the threeness of the Persons and tries to say just how three Persons can be one God.’ He claims that, ‘for ST, Father, Son and Spirit are three individual cases of deity, three divine substances, as Adam, Eve and Abel are three human substances.’” “Leftow contrasts ST with LT (Latin Trinitarianism): where ST starts from the threeness of the Persons and tries to hold belief in one God, LT begins ‘from the oneness of God, and (tries) to explain just how one God can be three Persons.’” “Throughout this paper I argue that LT itself includes a substantial ST component, that in light of this historical reality it appears that such criticisms as those of Leftow appear to be somwhat hasty and overdrawn, and that some important statements of ST do not obviously fall prey to either of the common criticisms.”
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Trenton Merricks, “Split Brains and the Godhead.” In Knowledge and Reality: Essays in Honor of Alvin Plantinga, ed. Thomas Crisp et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004). status: not yet published at this time
Abstract:
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Cornelius Plantinga Jr., “Social Trinity and Tritheism,” in Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. and Ronald J. Feenstra, eds., Trinity, Incarnation and Atonement (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989
Abstract: “The central problem of the doctrine of the Trinity is the definition and relation of the threeness and oneness. The author seeks to state a social theory of the Trinity and defend it against the objection that it is tritheistic. The three persons of the Trinity are defined as three “distinct centers of consciousness.” The Trinity as a whole is so tightly related that the word God can be used to describe the entire unit, which is one thing in itself. The author also investigates some of the historical background of this issue.”
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Cornelius Plantinga Jr., “The Threeness/Oneness Problem of the Trinity,” Calvin Theological Journal 23 (April 1988), 37-53.
Abstract: “The doctrine of the Trinity is a problem doctrine. The problems include the relation of the immanent and economic Trinities, the relation of the persons of the Trinity, and most importantly, the problem of threeness and oneness. One part of this is the difficulty of how to define the three persons while still maintaining one essence. The author puts forth three main analogies that attempt to solve this problem: the standard Latin Wester option, modalism, and the social view. The author concludes that, “the social view offers the best blend of biblical faithfulness and coherence…” especially as compared with the unity and diversity of the church.”
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Randal Rauser, “Is the Trinity a True Contradiction?” Quodlibet: Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy 4/4 (November 2002), at www.quodlibet.com.
Abstract (by author): “In this paper I propose to consider and interpretation of David Cunningham’s Trinitarian theology as affirming true contradiction. Finally, I will evaluate this approach to decide whether theologians ought to lift their age-old embargo on contradictions in theology.” He concludes that, “to identify a contradiction with God would undermine theology… leaving us in a morass of trivialism.”
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Michael Rea, “Relative Identity and the Doctrine of the Trinity,” Philosophia Christi, 2003.
Abstract (taken from author): “In the present paper, I hope to offer a more persuasive line of criticism. In particular, I will argue for the following two conclusions:
(i) It is possible to pursue the RI strategy without endorsing a Geach-style theory of relative identity. But doing so without telling an appropriate supplemental story about the metaphysics underlying RI relations leaves one with an incomplete solution to the problem of the Trinity and also leaves one vulnerable to the charge of polytheism.
(ii) Pursuing the RI strategy under the assumption that a Geach-style theory of relative identity is correct commits one to the view that the very existence of the divine Persons is a theory-dependent matter.
The consequences mention in (i) and (ii) are not acceptable. Thus, the RI strategy is unsuccessful as a stand-alone solution to the problem of the Trinity.”
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Melville Y. Stewart, “Trinitarian Willing and Salvific Initiatives” in The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, ed. Melville Y. Stewart (Kluwer, 2003), 53-74.
Abstract (by author): “One a social trinity model (ST), willings and energies of the three Person of the Trinity work together as One, with their soteriological roles giving place to and meshing with significant human freedom. Two accounts of ST are drawn, one ascribing omnipotence once to the Trinity (OSO), and the other three times to each Person (TPO). Both affirm a oneness of soteriological objectives; OSO avoids tritheism, TPO avoids tritheism and modalism. Sphere sovereignties of God and humans are preserved, as willings divine and human played out in the application and appropriation of redepemtion culminate in human exhaltation triumphally actualized in the denouement of eschatological fulfillment.”
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Richard Swinburne, “Could There Be More Than One God?” Faith and Philosophy, 5 (1988), 225-241.
Abstract: The author presents the argument that, “necessarily if there is at least one God, then there are three and only three Gods.” He does this by first demonstrating the unity of God and several of His attributes (including omnipotence, omniscience, and existence within time). He then proposes a hypothetical situation for the generation of the Son and Spirit of the Trinity that is based on love as the great good that necessitates the generation of multiple persons. These three “Gods” are one God in the sense that they are mutually interdependent and cannot exist without one another, and that they do not infringe on any essential attributes because that would destroy this loving relationship. (JG)
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Richard Swinburne, “Modern Anglo-American Philosophy of Religion” in The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, ed. Melville Y. Stewart (Kluwer, 2003), 13-22.
Abstract (by author): “The development of logical positivism into modern Anglo-American (“analytic”) philosophy involved in the recognition that for propositions to be meaningful it was necessary only that they should be confirmable or disconfirmable by experience; and that often they used words in analogical or metaphorical senses. This allowed the development of philosophy of religion within that tradition, claiming that propositions about God were also confirmable and used words in analogical and metaphorical senses. Some analytics philosophers have claimed that the proposition that there is a God can be properly basic (that is needs no argument for us justifiably to hold it), while others claimed that good arguments can be produced for the existence of God. It is within such a developed philosophy of religion, that Anglo-American philosophers have developed views about the meaning and justification of the doctrine of the Trinity.”
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Dale Tuggy, “Tradition and Believability: Edward Wierenga’s Social Trinitarianism”, Philosophia Christi 5:2 (2003), 447-56.
Abstract (taken from author): “Trinitarian theories face three basic problems: inconsistency, unintelligibility, and poor fit with Christian tradition from the Bible on. In his recent “Trinity and Polytheism,” Edward Wierenga develops a careful, philosophically sophisticated version of Social Trinitarian doctrine with an eye towards avoiding some of these problems. I will argue that the account does avoid the first problem, albeit at a cost. Unfortunately, it does not quite avoid the second problem, and it runs squarely into the last. After discussing these shortfalls, I will consider some important methodological issues which remain largely unaddressed in recent philosophical discussions of the Trinity.” These include the question of what makes up tradition, how tradition ought to be used, whether the Athanasian Creed ought to be authoritative, and the purpose of these discussions of the trinity. In the conclusion, Wierenga is finally accused of a “sort of polytheism” himself.
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Dale Tuggy, “Divine deception, identity, and Social Trinitarianism,” Religious Studies 40 (2004).
Abstract (by author): “After laying out the claims and motivations of Social Trinitarianism, I develop three new arguments against it. According to the first two, if Social Trinitarism were true, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit would have engaged in wrongful deception via both Old and New Testament revelation. I briefly consider the strength of the arguments and some possible replies to them, concluding that they constitute good reasons to deny that version of trinitarian doctrine. According to the final argument, Social Trinitarianism is incompatible with two central claims of the New Testament.”
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Dale Tuggy, “The unfinished business of Trinitarian theorizing,” Religious Studies 39 (2003),165-83.
Abstract (by author): “In recent years, many resourceful thinkers have brought a new clarity to the issues surrounding the doctrine of the Trinity. Two incompatible families of Trinitarian doctrine have been clearly distinguished: Social Trinitarianism and Latin Trinitarianism. I argue here that no theory in either camp has yet evaded the triune pitfalls of inconsistency, unintelligibility, and poor fit with the Bible. These two main approaches appear to be hopeless, and I argue that appeals to ‘mystery’ are no way to avoid the difficulties at hand. Thus, the trinitarian project is as yet unfinished. ”
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Dale Tuggy, “The Trinitarian Dilemma” in The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, ed. Melville Y. Stewart (Kluwer, 2003), 23-34.
Abstract (by author): “In recent years, many resourceful thinkers have brought a new clarity to the issues surrounding the doctrine of the Trinity. Two incompatible families of Trinitarian doctrine have been clearly distinguished: Social Trinitarianism and Latin Trinitarianism. I argue here that no theiry in either camp evades the triune pitfalls of inconsistency, unintelligibility, and poor fit with the Bible. These two main approaches appear to be hopeless, and I argue that appeals to “mystery” are no way to avoid the difficulties at hand. Thus, the Trinitarian project is as yet unifinished.
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Peter van Inwagen, “And Yet They Are Not Three Gods but One God,” Philosophy and the Christian Faith, ed. Thomas Morris (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 241-78.
Abstract: “My primary purpose in this paper is to explore one way of replying to the charge that Christians are either simply polytheists or else polytheists and monotheists at the same time. I shall not be terribly unhappy if the reply I propose to explore turns out to be unsatisfactory. The Trinity has always been described as a mystery, as something that surpasses human understanding.” “I propose to state the doctrine of the Trinity (or part of it: the part that raises all those pointed logical and metaphysical questions) in such a way that it is demonstrable that no formal contradiction can be derived from the thesis that God is three persons and, at the same time, one being.” “The device I shall exploit for this purpose is the notion of relative identity, familiar to us from the work of professor Geach.” “What I shall try to do is to expand these suggestive remarks about in such a way as to enable us to see what a systematic and thoroughgoing attempt to express the propositions of Trinitarian theology in terms of relative identity would look like.”
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Peter van Inwagen, “The Trinity,” the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig, Vol. IX, New York: Routledge Publishers, 1998, 457-461.
Abstract (by author): “… The doctrine of the Trinity seems on the face of it to be logically incoherent. It seems to imply that identity is not transitive– for the Father is identical with God, the Son is identical with God, and the Father is not identical with the Son. There have been two recent attempts by philosophers to defend the logical coherency of the doctrine. Richard Swinburne has suggested trhat the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit be thought of as numerically distinct Gods, and he has argues that, properly understood, this suggestion is consisent with historical orthodoxy. Peter Geach and various others have suggested that a coherent statement of this doctrine is possible on the assumption that idenitity is ‘always relative to a sortal term.’ Swinburne’s formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity is certainly free from logical incoherency, but it is debatable whether is it consistent with historical orthodoxy. As to ‘relative identity’ formulations of the doctrine, not all philosophers would agree that the idea that identity is always relative to a sortal term is even intelligible.”
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Peter van Inwagen, “Three Persons in One Being: On Attempts to Show that the Doctrine of the Trinity is Self-Contradictory” in The Trinity: East/West Dialogue, ed. Melville Y. Stewart (Kluwer, 2003), 23-34.
Abstract (by author): “Enemies of the Church have frequently contended that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity is not only false, but violates various elementary logical principles. In this essay, I show that, on one understanding of the doctrine, the charge is unfounded.”
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Edward Wierenga, “Trinity and Polytheism,” Faith and Philosophy, 21 (2004) 281-294.
Abstract (by author): “This paper develops an interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity, drawn from Augustine and the Athanasian Creed. Such a doctrine includes Divinity Claims (the persons are divine), Diversity Claims (the persons are distinct), and a Uniqueness Claim (there is only one God). I propose and defend an interpretation of these theses according to which they are neither logically incompatible nor do they entail that there are three (or 4) Gods.”
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Keith Yandell, “Trinity and Consistency,” Religious Studies, 30 (1994) 201-218.
Abstract: The author’s purpose is to “… state one version of a doctrine of the Trinity that is logically consistent, and it is not monistic or polytheistic.” He does this by considering “three arguments for the conclusion that Trinitarian theology is contradictory. Then [he] will develop an outline of Trinitarian doctrine that is not subject to these objections.” The objections include what the author names the “no differentiating properties” argument, the “producing the contradiction” argument, and the “individuality and entailment” argument. He responds by building the two premises: that “Necessarily, if God exists then God is Trinitarian,” and that, “Necessarily, if God is Trinitarian, then it is logically impossible that one Trinitarian member exist and another not exist.” With this, the author sets the stage for further discussion on the specific nature of the Trinity.
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Linda Zagsebski, “Christian Monotheism,” Faith and Philosophy, 6 (1989) 3-18.
Abstract (by author): “In this paper I present an argument that there can be no more than one God in a way that allows me to give the doctrine of the Trinity logical priority over the attributes traditionally used in arguments for God’s unicity. The argument that there is one God makes no assumptions about the particular attributes included in divinity. It only uses the Identity of Indiscernibles and a Principle of Plenitude. I then offer a theory on the relationship between individuals and kinds which allows me to offer an interpretation of the Trinity.”