Buying Alaska or Why Good Foreign Policy is Still Good Even If Done for A Bad Reason

Most of us are very glad that Seward bought Alaska from the Russians . . . though probably not every day. (The kind of eccentric who spends hours a day thinking of Seward is not the target audience of this site.)

It is the kind of good decision that is so good that it becomes part of daily assumptions.

So even though most of us not doing a cruise up the West coast (or living there) have not been thankful lately that we are fifty and not forty-nine states, it is only because it would be so terrible if we are stripped of the Last Frontier that we ignore the idea.

Wasn’t Alaska manifestly destined to be American?

Those of us old enough to remember the Cold War are tempted to send flowers to that forgotten statesman for delivering the United States from the prospect of communist missiles (heck, even Putin’s missiles) that close to the United States. Anybody who has ever seen the stunning beauty of the state cannot image a US without her.

Buying huge amounts of gorgeous and resource rich territory for next to nothing is a good idea on general principles.

Oddly, the main reason for buying Alaska was to thank the Russians for being our best friends during the American Civil War. The short term political motivation for the sale was a kind of pay off to the reformist elements in the Tsarist government.

Americans have conveniently forgotten that this reformist Tsarist government freed the serfs before Republican America freed the slaves . . . and often gave the serfs a better deal than Reconstruction gave African-Americans.

Even stranger is that the Russian government was not that eager to sell Alaska . . . it is a myth that they were losing money on the project and the average Russian resented losing any territory. Certainly the native Americans in Alaska did not long for the sale. The Tsarist government continued to do more for education in Alaska (even after the sale until the Russian Revolution), than the US government was willing to do for Orthodox native Americans.

Instead, the Russians hoped to cement a friendship between the two nations by giving Seward and the Republicans what the Russians thought they wanted: Alaska.

The Russians wanted Alaska, but sold it. The Americans (most of us) did not want it and bought it. There was a deal with short term buyers and sellers remorse built into it!

The sale was unpopular in both Russian and the United States. Americans outside of government thought they had bought “an ice box” for millions . . . the Russians outside of government believed they had sold out thousands of Orthodox Russian citizens to the crazy Americans for next to nothing.

Safe to say that the sale did nothing to build good will between the two nations.

From the US government perspective, it is was still a good idea.

Why? It is always a good idea to keep a foreign power further away . . . especially an autocracy.

In the end, the sale was approved by a less than enthusiastic Congress and US citizens had one of the great real estate bargains of all time.

The short term political sizzle of helping Our Friends the Russians . . . did not work. The long term idea (which was also present in a few wise minds) was sound and the long term pay off has been immense for the US.

It is important to keep the lessons of the Alaska sale in mind when looking at foreign policy today. Something that is a good idea on general principles is still a good idea . . . even if the political or immediate motives fall through. History has a way of rewarding good long term thinking, even if the short term planning goes awry.

The Bush administration has made some good long term decisions in Iraq . . . but sold it with some bad short term reasoning.

Getting rid of Sadaam, putting American bases in the Middle East, and building a friendly more stable Iraq are all good ideas that could still put Bush on Rushmore.

In a Global War on Terror a man like Sadaam who was busy cozying up to every anti-American force for evil on the planet could not be tolerated.

Getting rid of a lunatic like Sadaam is good on general principles. Putting a more responsible government in the region is also a good idea . . . and if it turns out to be even a bit democratic might change the region forever.

History will judge such long term wisdom kindly.

The short term errors may even be forgotten . . . as Seward’s have mostly been.

It turns out (to date) that some of the short term reasons for going to Iraq were not good. There were no WMD, though Sadaam did everything he could to make people think there were. Iraq has been less stable than the Administration hoped.

The sizzle used to sell good idea turned out badly.

Still, despite the short term political damage . . . we are sitting on a valuable piece of real estate, don’t have to leave any time soon . . . and can project power to the Middle East in ways impossible before the War. Iraq still looks like it might become a stable country that is not ruled by an insane foe of the US and friend of terrorists.

The lesson: Don’t give up on a good idea just because the short term political goals were not met.

Some fun sources I have been reading for background:

Russian America by Hector Chevigny
Orthodox Alaska by Michael Oleksa
Journal of the Priest Ioann Veniaminov in Alaska